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aifornia v.
A Quarter-Century of Complex, Litigious
Self-Determination
By Matthew L.M. Fletcher
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in California v. Ca-
bazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), may
be the most momentous decision in federal Indian law in
the last 50 years. The decision provided a federal com-
mon law basis for Indian tribes to engage in high-stakes
bingo and other gaming activities without state regulation,
even in so-called Public Law 280 states like California that
have criminal jurisdiction inside of Indian country. Caba-
zon Band provoked Congress to finally codify a regulatory
scheme for Indian gaming, including an enactment that
authorized Las Vegas-style casino gaming, under specific
conditions, in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988,
25 U.S.C. 5 2701 et seq. Indian gaming, as a direct result
of Cabazon Band, now has a market that generates more
than $26 billion a year nationally.'
The Case
The state of California allowed bingo games to be played
within the state for charity purposes, as long as the prizes
for each game did not exceed $250.2 Riverside County, the
home of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians and the
Morongo Band of Mission Indians, regulated these bingo
games and also banned so-called card rooms. The Cabazon
and Morongo Bands opened up high-stakes bingo halls
(Cabazon also operated a card room) and purported to op-
erate them without regard to the state law and the county
ordinances. California and the county sued the Cabazon
Band, and the lower courts held that the state and county
laws did not apply to the tribe. The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
Usually, when the Supreme Court grants a petition to
review a decision made by a lower court, the Court does so
with an eye toward reversing the lower court.3 Previous to
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Cabazon Band, the Supreme
Court had declined to review earlier decisions involving
the Seminole Tribe of Florida and the Barona Group of
Capitan Band of Mission Indians that favored those tribes.'
State government observers must have been as elated as
tribal advocates were disheartened by the Court's decision
to grant certiorari in Cabazon Band, especially because the
lower courts uniformly favored tribal interests. Legislative
negotiations in Congress about regulating Indian gaming
stalled as the parties favoring state interests or an overall
federal ban on Indian gaming sensed imminent victory.'
In a major surprise, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Ninth Circuit in a 6-3 decision. The majority opinion in
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Cabazon reaffirmed and clarified two important aspects of
federal Indian law: the civil-regulatory/criminal-prohibitory
analysis under Public Law 280 and the federal Indian law
pre-emption analysis. For background purposes, Public
Law 280 is a congressional statute that purported to extend
state jurisdiction into Indian country in six states. In Caba-
zon, the Court's decision affirmed the so-called civil-regu-
latory/criminal-prohibitory distinction. The way it works is
that a state statute that is "criminal-prohibitory" applies to
activities that take place on the reservation, whereas a stat-
ute that is "civil-prohibitory" does not. Cabazon held that
the state and county gaming laws were "civil-prohibitory,"
because they do not flat-out ban all gaming operations but
merely purport to regulate them. The federal Indian law
pre-emption doctrine held that, if the federal government
and tribal interests are strong enough, they can pre-empt
the application of nondiscriminatory state laws in Indian
country in all states, including non-Public Law 280 states.
Perhaps because the Court has retreated somewhat from
those doctrines,6 the most important aspect of the opinion
is the public policy analysis that the Court employed. Cali-
fornia argued that state restrictions on gaming should apply
in Indian country because of the possibility of organized
criminal infiltration of tribal gaming operations, and the
possible zones of unethical behavior that the state alleged
would develop if gaming continued without state interven-
tion. The tribes responded that the state had authorized
multiple forms of gaming-such as the lottery, card rooms,
horse racing, dog racing, charity bingo, and other forms
of gambling-and California had no choice but to con-
cede the tribes' argument. The state really couldn't argue
with any force that criminal activity related to gaming was
unique to Indian country when so much gaming occurred
in accordance with state law, although it certainly did not
stop the state from trying to do so.
The tribes also argued forcefully-and persuasively, as
it turned out-that the gaming operations constituted the
sole source of economic activity on the reservations:
The Cabazon and Morongo Reservations contain no
natural resources which can be exploited. The tribal
games at present provide the sole source of revenues
for the operation of the tribal governments and the
provision of tribal services. They are also the ma-
jor sources of employment on the reservations. Self-
determination and economic development are not
within reach if the Tribes cannot raise revenues and
provide employment for their members.7
In the most critical component of the majority opinion
in Cabazon, the Court noted the extent to which federal
interests paralleled tribal interests permeating tribal gaming
development:
These are important federal interests. They were reaf-
firmed by the President's 1983 Statement on Indian
Policy. More specifically, the Department of the In-
terior, which has the primary responsibility for carry-
ing out the Federal Government's trust obligations to
Indian tribes, has sought to implement these policies
by promoting tribal bingo enterprises. Under the In-
dian Financing Act of 1974, ... the Secretary of the In-
terior has made grants and has guaranteed loans for
the purpose of constructing bingo facilities. ... The
Department of Housing and Urban Development and
the Department of Health and Human Services have
also provided financial assistance to develop tribal
gaming enterprises. ... Here, the Secretary of the
Interior has approved tribal ordinances establishing
and regulating the gaming activities involved. ... The
Secretary has also exercised his authority to review
tribal bingo management contracts under 25 U.S.C.
§ 81, and has issued detailed guidelines governing
that review."
Tying tribal and federal interests together in this manner
significantly undercut California's public policy assertions.
As the Court has shown repeatedly over the decades, fed-
eral interests are far more important to the Supreme Court
than tribal interests are. Cabazon Band set the stage for
the final congressional negotiations over how the federal
government would codify and regulate Indian gaming, if it
did so at all.
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Cabazon
Band, in 1988, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regu-
latory Act (IGRA), an incredibly complex statute that has
spawned hundreds of lawsuits in federal, state, and tribal
courts in nearly every jurisdiction in the nation. The statute
provided a statutory basis for Indian gaming that, despite
the intense litigation surrounding key aspects of Indian
gaming, has provided an important measure of predictabil-
ity and legitimacy to Indian gaming. Most importantly, the
IGRA codified the Cabazon Band holding, giving congres-
sional consent to high-stakes bingo operations conducted
for tribal government purposes on tribal lands and under
tribal regulations.
The real crux of the IGRA was the provision for casino
gaming: the so-called Class III games. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d).9
Prior to Cabazon Band, tribal, federal, and state stakehold-
ers all but assumed that Congress would not authorize In-
dian gaming, in part because the Johnson Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1171 et seq., prohibited slot machines and other lucra-
tive games in Indian country. But Cabazon Band dramati-
cally changed the landscape, and tribal interests success-
fully lobbied to include a mechanism for casino games.
The mechanism is almost laughably complex and is a key
generator of litigation, but it is also a powerful engine for
cooperation between tribes and states on any number of
important governance issues.
The IGRA required tribes and states to negotiate a Class
III gaming compact, assuming the state authorized some
form of casino-style games, such as a charity games (hark-
ing back to the Cabazon Band analysis). The compact
would detail the regulatory regime for the gaming opera-
tions, state which games could be played, and explain how
the tribe would deal with the impacts (for example, public
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safety) of its operations on surrounding communities. The
IGRA banned states from demanding taxes in compacts
and also provided that, if a state governor refused to nego-
tiate in "good faith," the tribe could take the state to federal
court and either force negotiations or ask the Department
of the Interior to promulgate a compact for the tribe.
Good Faith Lawsuits and the Seminole Tribe Ruling
The first round of lawsuits arising out of the IGRA were
the so-called good faith lawsuits. States believed that Con-
gress did not have the authority under the Commerce
Clause to abrogate state sovereign immunity and force
state negotiations. In 1996, the Supreme Court agreed with
the states in the ruling handed down in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), which returned to
the states much of the bargaining power they had lost as
a result of Cabazon Band. For about two years after the
decision, no tribe was successful in negotiating a Class III
compact, but that changed quickly after the Department of
Interior began to acquiesce in a series of nifty legal maneu-
vers that have benefited both tribes and states over the last
two decades.
Two important states, Connecticut and Michigan, had
negotiated revenue-sharing provisions with the eight tribes
located within their borders prior to Seminole Tribe. Rev-
enue sharing is not much different from a tax on Indian
gaming-a tax prohibited by the IGRA. But because they
were faced with reticent state governors, the tribes in those
states agreed to share their revenues (10 percent in Michi-
gan and 25 percent in Connecticut) in exchange for what
would later become known as a "meaningful concession."10
In those two states, the tribes negotiated for a monopoly
on Las Vegas-style gaming. After the Seminole Tibe deci-
sion, other tribes in other states began to follow suit, and
Class III gaming began to mushroom.
For more than 10 years after Seminole Tribe, Indian
gaming expanded almost exponentially. The state leader-
ship in California and Oklahoma, states with enormous
gaming markets, finally entered into Class III gaming com-
pacts with significant revenue-sharing provisions. Each
state could be said to have a percentage of Indian gam-
ing revenue, which the state leadership could demand in
exchange for a gaming compact. However, the promise of
market exclusivity also began to erode as more and more
tribes entered the gaming market, and some states began to
authorize various forms of gaming under state law. States
seemed to be demanding higher and higher percentages
in exchange for a smaller economic benefit to tribes. In
2010, the Ninth Circuit held that California had negotiated
in bad faith with the Rincon Band of Luiseio Mission Indi-
ans when the state sought 10-15 percent of tribal gaming
revenue in exchange for what the court found was virtually
nothing of value in Rincon Band of Luisenlo Mission Indi-
ans of the Rincon Reservation v. Scbwarzenegger, 602 F.3d
1019 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011).
Revenue sharing between tribes and states is in a state of
confusion and uncertainty, and this question will affect the
future of tribal gaming."
Tribal Self-Determination
In the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Congress man-
dated that a tribe's gaming profits must be used for tribal
governance purposes. 25 U.S.C. 5 2710(b)(2)(B). For the
200 or so Indian tribes that operate gaming facilities profit-
ably, the revenues have helped bring the members of those
tribes up from economic destitution to the lower-middle
class-an important development.12 Most successful gam-
ing tribes can afford to supplement the federal housing,
health, public safety, and other federal appropriations with
gaming revenues, but only a small number of tribes-most
likely fewer than 20-have enough gaming revenue to be
truly self-determinative.
That said, there are two important positive consequenc-
es to Indian gaming that very few people have really dis-
cussed. The first is the development of tribal institutions
arising out of the need to regulate gaming enterprises strict-
ly. The National Indian Gaming Commission, state regula-
tors, tribal regulators, and even tribal creditors have placed
layer over layer of regulation and strict compliance mecha-
nisms on Indian gaming to ensure that Indian gaming is
clean and protected from negative elements like organized
crime. The beneficiaries of this incredible amount of regu-
lation are tribal governance institutions. Tribal members
employed by the gaming entity either as gaming managers
or regulators quickly learn multiple and pervasive aspects
of governance-from surveillance to regulatory paperwork
and financial statements. Tribal gaming employees often
move back and forth from the tribal government side, and
they bring with them their expertise in business manage-
ment and regulation.
A second important contribution of Indian gaming is im-
provement in relationships between tribal-state-local govern-
ments. The IGRA requires tribal leaders and state governors
to negotiate gaming compacts before casino-style gaming
can take place. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d). As a result, state of-
ficials and tribal leaders who otherwise might not talk to
each other in a civil manner now find it expedient to talk,
and once that barrier is down, negotiations on any number
of previously impassable tribal-state-local conflicts can de-
velop. Sharing the revenues coming from tribal gaming en-
courages cooperation among all these levels of government;
even better, where revenue sharing is not an option, tribes
are being smart and progressive about their ability to use
gaming revenues in creative ways to open doors at the state
and local level. All of these developments are attributable
to the Supreme Court's Cabazon Band decision and related
cases, in which state and local officials who once used shot-
guns and threats of incarceration to influence Indian tribes
are now dealing with Indian tribes as peers.
The Dark Side of Indian Gaming
Gaming has consequences, and perhaps the biggest
consequence for the most successful Indian tribes has been
the need to deal with influxes of cash and assets into tribal
governments and, through revenue allocation plans, to in-
dividual members of the tribe." In the context of tribal
government actions, some tribal councils-especially those
in California, but councils elsewhere as well-have noto-
52 | The Federal Lawyer I April 2012
HeinOnline  -- 59 Fed. Law. 52 2012
riously begun the process of shrinking their enrollments
through a process of disenrollment and even banishment
of whole swaths of the tribe's membership. This develop-
ment appears to outsiders to be a crass effort to increase
remaining members' per capita share of the tribe's gaming
revenue. These tribes usually do not have a tribal court
system, and federal courts generally do not have jurisdic-
tion over tribal membership claims. Therefore, assuming
these Indians have lost their membership in the tribe ille-
gitimately, they have little recourse.
A second consequence of gaming is related to the first,
and it involves the ramifications of paying tribal gaming
revenues to tribal members per capita. Tribal members re-
ceiving per capita payments, especially large sums, may
have had no prior experience with dealing with such large
amounts of money. There is some anecdotal evidence that
tribal members do not handle such influxes well, with many
asserting that younger tribal members see no value in con-
tinuing education, for example, because their "per caps"
cover their expenses. Moreover, outsiders view these pay-
ments as cash cows, and at least one state court has held
that a father who was a tribe member was not required to
pay child support because his ex-wife and child-both of
whom were tribe members-were both entitled to signifi-
cant per capita payments. See Cypress v.Jumper, 990 So. 2d
576 (Fla. App. 2008).
In its ruling in Cabazon Band, the Supreme Court re-
jected California's assertion that the state's interest in regu-
lating (and even banning) Indian gaming related to the
threat of organized crime, corruption, prostitution, drugs,
and any other crimes the state's lawyers imagined were
attached to gaming operations. In the dissent to Cabazon
Band, Justice Stevens wrote: "Accepting the majority's rea-
soning would require exemptions for cockfighting, tattoo
parlors, nude dancing, houses of prostitution, and other
illegal but profitable enterprises." Cabazon Band, 480 U.S.
at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As a general matter, none of
those concerns have arisen in Indian gaming.
Finally, one dark side to Indian gaming is the inequity
among tribes that gaming has fostered. The large major-
ity of Indian tribes have no gaming enterprises at all, and
only a very small minority of tribes could be said to be
overly successful. To some extent, there is a "one percent"
problem in Indian gaming, just as there is in the rest of the
American economy.
The Future of Indian Gaming: The Legacy of Cabazon Band
The future of Indian gaming is murky. Since the begin-
ning of the explosion of Indian gaming, commentators and
tribal leaders have worried that gaming was a temporary
opportunity and that the market for Indian gaming would
eventually decline or even disappear. Tribal leaders knew
that gaming would never be a complete solution to the
socioeconomic problems in Indian country that date back
centuries, and these leaders have sought to diversify their
tribes' economic portfolios since the beginning of the gam-
ing explosion. In fact, the market seems to have reached a
plateau. When the Supreme Court decided Cabazon Band,
only Nevada and New Jersey had significant casino-style
gaming. Early tribal gaming operations had the benefit of
only having to compete with one another, but that has
all changed dramatically. Dozens of states have authorized
some form of casino-style gaming outside of Indian coun-
try, and Internet gaming is on the horizon. Even though
Indian gaming currently enjoys revenues totaling more
than $26 billion a year market, that market share could fall
dramatically and it could fall soon.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's reasoning behind its deci-
sion in Cabazon Band has not aged well. Some, including
myself, argue that the Supreme Court's views on Indian af-
fairs have changed, perhaps as a result of the explosion of
Indian gaming the Court might not have foreseen. None of
the reasoning in Cabazon Band has been overruled, but
one of the key foundations of the opinion-federal Indian
pre-emption doctrine-has all but disappeared from the le-
gal landscape as an effective tool for tribal interests. Two
years after Cabazon Band, the Supreme Court in Cotton Pe-
troleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), all but eviscer-
ated the pre-emption doctrine, finding that a tribe's govern-
mental interest in avoiding state taxation of nonmembers on
its territory was negligible. The same kinds of interests that
at least partially animated the Court in Cabazon Band-lack
of economic development opportunities in a desert environ-
ment-meant almost nothing in Cotton Petroleum.
The second foundation of the Cabazon Band decision,
the interpretation of Public Law 280 through the civil-reg-
ulatory/criminal-prohibitory distinction, remains intact. But
the Court has not returned to the common law that has
arisen out of this area, and state courts are left to their
own devices to flesh out the meaning of the doctrine in
a wide variety of cases. The outcomes in such cases are
unpredictable, as tribal and state advocates in Washing-
ton, California, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and elsewhere have
complained for many years.'4
Regardless, Cabazon Band remains one of the most im-
portant decisions in Indian law of the modem era dating back
to the 1950s. Courts and commentators have cited the ruling
more than 2,300 times, demonstrating its continued relevance
as a starting point for tricky questions of federal Indian law.
And no case has been more important to Indian gaming com-
munities and even to Indian tribes that do not engage in gam-
ing than Cabazon Band has, because the decision has created
an area where Indian tribes can develop a political, legal, and
economic infrastructure that all of Indian country enjoys to
this day. Ask any Indian lawyer who worked in Indian coun-
try back in the 1980s and before then. TFL
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